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Case No. 20100792-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

HARRY MILLER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a guilty plea to attempted possession or use of a
controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010) and 76-4-101 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

1

This brief cites to the current criminal code, as amendments to statutes
following the events in this case do not affect the resolution of issues raised on
appeal.
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Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Beckstead, 2006 UT 42, f 7,
140 P.3d 1288.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provision and statutes are attached at
Addendum A:
U.S. Const, amend. VI;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8.5 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010);
UtahR.Crim.P.11.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 1,2009, Defendant was near 271 West 200 South in Salt Lake
City, where Salt Lake City Police Officer Mike Hamideh was working
undercover as a "dealer/7 Rl-2. Officer Hamideh approached Defendant and
asked," Amigo roca?" a common term for "rock" cocaine. R53; 72:3. Defendant
replied, "Yeah, I'd like $10 worth" and showed him his money. Id. Defendant
was arrested. R72:3. When Officer Hamideh searched Defendant, he found $12
in Defendant's pocket. Id. The attempted drug transaction occurred 432 feet
from a church. Id. Defendant was charged with attempted possession or use of
<
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a controlled substance, enhanced to a third-degree felony because the offense
was committed within 1000 feet of a place of worship. Rl-2.
On November 2,2009, W. Andrew McCullough entered his appearance as
Defendant's retained counsel. R4. Soon afterward, Mr. McCullough moved to
dismiss the information on the grounds that "attempted possession of a
controlled substance is not a proscribed offense/' and that an attempt to possess
drugs in a drug free zone was an " invalid enhancement" where there were no
drugs at the scene. R16-22.
On January 11,2010, Judge Barrett denied the motion. R31. On or about
January 21,2010, Mr. McCullough filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with
this Court seeking review of the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
R38,40. On February 26,2010, this Court denied the petition, and the case was
remitted back to the trial court. See Order, R41-43 (Addendum B).
No action on the case appears in the record until July 28, 2010, when
Defendant made an initial appearance before Judge Medley. R47. The court
found Defendant indigent and appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association to represent Defendant.

R47. There is no transcript of the

proceeding in the record, and the minute entry does not reflect any reference to
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the status of Mr. McCullough's representation of Defendant by either Defendant
or the court. Id. A roll call was scheduled for August 3,2010. R48.
On August 2, appointed counsel, Andrea Garland, entered her
appearance and filed preliminary discovery requests. R62-68. The following
day, on August 3, Ms. Garland appeared with Defendant before Judge Toomey.
R60; 82:2. Neither the minute entry of that hearing nor the transcript of the
proceedings reflect any reference to the status of Mr. McCullough's
representation of Defendant by Defendant, Ms. Garland, or the court. R60-61;
82:2-7. At that hearing, Defendant pled guilty to attempted possession or use of
a controlled substance after the State agreed to remove the enhancement, thus
reducing the offense to a class A misdemeanor. R52-60; R82:2-7.
Judge Toomey incorporated Defendant's Statement in Support of Guilty
Plea into the plea taking. See R 52-59, at 53-55 (" Affidavit/' attached at
Addendum C); R82:3-5 ("Plea Hearing" transcript attached at Addendum D).
Defendant's Affidavit stated: "I have not waived my right to counsel." Id. at 54.
Defendant acknowledged that his attorney was "Andrea J. Garland." Id. He
also swore that he "believe [d] himself to be of sound and discerning mind and
to be mentally capable of understanding these proceedings and the
consequences of [his] plea"and that he was "free of any mental... impairment
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that would prevent [him] from understanding what [he] was doing or from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering [his] plea." R56. Defendant
also swore that he was "satisfied with the advice and assistance of [his]
attorney." Id.
The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and "based on the facts set forth
in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the Defendant and counsel,
and based on any oral representations in court," the court found that
Defendant's guilty plea was "freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made." R59.
On September 14,2010, Mr. McCullough moved on Defendant's behalf to
withdraw Defendant's guilty plea. See Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, R69-70
(Addendum E). Mr. McCullough argued that Defendant should be able to
withdraw his plea because, although he was represented by retained counsel at
the time, he was represented by appointed counsel at the plea hearing. R69-70.
Mr. McCullough asserted that he would not have advised Defendant to plead
guilty because "the charged office does not exist," but that, when Defendant had
last appeared in court," [Defendant] was told that counsel had withdrawn." Id.
The motion to withdraw, however, did not include an affidavit from Defendant
supporting Mr. McCullough's contention. Id.
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On September 20, 2010, Mr. McCullough appeared with Defendant at
sentencing before Judge Barrett.

See Transcript of Sentencing, R83:2-8

(Addendum F). Mr. McCullough first addressed the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, reiterating the same facts set out in the motion and noting that the
record did not contain his withdrawal in the case. Id. at 3. In an attempt to track
any oversight, Judge Barrett reviewed the proceedings from July 28:
The Court: Then let's see, he was - - July 28th he was arraigned,
and I don't know that any - - that [Defendant] advised anybody
or if it's on the record anywhere that he advised that you were
still representing him. I don't know. It just shows here that he
was appointed an attorney by Judge Medley.
Mr. McCullough: I didn't know. Nobody told me a thing.
The Court: He should have said something.
Mr. McCullough: He should have, your Honor. I think he was
confused. I think he was led somewhere to believe that I had
withdrawn.
The Court: Well, there's nothing in the record here that shows
that. It just shows he was appointed an attorney, and there's no
indication of any kind of a withdrawal or anything. If someone
hadn't told Judge Medley, all he's looking at is the Information.
So he wouldn't know that you represented him.
<

Mr. McCullough: Well, I understand that, but you know,
obviously if I had known I [sic] had been here.
The Court: Well, I appreciate that.
i

Id. at 3-4 (brackets added).
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At that point, Judge Barrett asked if Defendant wanted to withdraw his
guilty plea. Id. at 4. After initially suggesting that he would like to convert
Defendant's guilty plea to a Sen/—a conditional—plea, Mr. McCullough
renewed Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at 5. At first, the
court stated that a hearing would be required, but immediately reconsidered its
suggestion:
The Court: [I]t's a problem because he was represented by an
attorney and we went through the colloquy with him and we
have -- she went through the long form with him.
Mr. McCullough: I understand that, your Honor, but
The Court: And then he entered his plea.
Mr. McCullough: The crime to which he pled does not exist.
The Court: Well, that's your position, but he pled to it and I'm
going to - -1 accepted the plea. So unless you can convince me
that the appellate court in a written opinion is going to say that
it's - -• there's no such crime, he's stuck.
Mr. McCullough: Well, they are going to say that, your Honor,
if you'll give them a chance.
The Court: No. No. I'm not going to allow him to withdraw his
plea. What do you want to do about sentencing?
Id. at 5-6. Defendant agreed to be sentenced immediately. Id. at 6. The court
sentenced Defendant to a statutory term of one year in jail, but suspended the
sentence and placed him on probation for eighteen months. Id. at 8; R74-75.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant timely appealed. R76.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In doing so, Defendant does not claim
that the trial court violated rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, when
it took his plea. Rather, Defendant claims that other factors rendered his plea
unknowing and involuntary.
First, Defendant asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary
because he was represented by appointed counsel at the time of his plea, even
though he was still represented by retained counsel. Defendant claims that the
trial court should have independently reviewed the record to determine
whether Defendant was represented before appointing counsel. Defendant
alternatively claims that the trial court's appointment of counsel while he was
represented by retained counsel violated his right to counsel of choice.
Neither of Defendant's specific claims were preserved below. Thus, for
this Court to reach them, Defendant must argue that plain error justifies their
review. Because Defendant has not argued plain error, this Court should
decline to reach his claims. In any case, because Defendant has not cited any
case law clearly governing his claims, Defendant's plain error claims fail
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because he has not shown that the court's errors, if any, should have been
obvious, as is necessary to prevail on a plain error claim. In other words,
Defendant's claims fail as inadequately briefed.
Alternatively, Defendant claims that his guilty plea was unknowing and
involuntary because he pled to a crime that does not exist, especially where the
drugs he sought to buy did not exist. This claim fails as a matter of statutory
construction. By statute, the attempt provision of the criminal code applies to
the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Also by statute, the fact that
Defendant attempted to possess drugs that did not exist does not constitute a
defense to his attempt charge.
ARGUMENT
•

• I .

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOWTHATTHE PLEA WAS NOT
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Defendant argues first
that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was represented by
appointed counsel rather than his previously retained counsel. Id. at 10.
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Defendant argues second that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because
the crime to which he pled was not actually a crime. Id. at 13-20.
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made/ 7 Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010). "A 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty
is a privilege, not a right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial
court."" State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 9,1 P.3d 1108 (quoting "State v. Gallegos,
738 P.2d 1040,1041 (Utah 1987)). "[The reviewing court] will not disturb the
trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea unless it clearly
appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of discretion." Id.
Here, Defendant's first claim fails because it was not preserved below and
Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. It also fails because it is not
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adequately briefed. Defendant's second claim fails because it is contrary to
Utah's statutory law.2

2

Defendant attempts throughout his argument to magnify the trial
court's alleged abuse of discretion by speculating as to its resultant harm on a
tangential matter. Aplt. Br. at 7-8, 10, 12. He notes that the prosecutor
represented at the plea hearing that Defendant's rap sheet appeared to indicate
that Defendant might have been convicted of a first degree felony for which
Defendant served three years in prison. Aplt. Br. at 10-11 (citing R82:7).
Defendant asserts that, unlike the prosecutor, Mr. McCullough knew that that
charge had been dismissed. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. (In fact, the presentence
investigation report (PSI) does show that a conviction for a first degree felony in
2000 was reversed on appeal and the case dismissed on July 6, 2007. R72:4.)
Therefore, Defendant suggests, if the trial court had not overlooked that he was
still represented by Mr. McCullough, Mr. McCullough would purportedly have
informed the court that the first degree felony had been dismissed, and the court
"might" not have held Defendant in jail pending the sentencing. Id.
The Court should not consider Defendant's repeated recitation of this
matter because it is irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 7-8,
11,12. The prosecutor's erroneous comment, made after Defendant had pleaded
guilty, see R82:6, has no relation to whether Defendant's plea was involuntary.
Moreover, Defendant acknowledges that even if the trial court had been
informed correctly concerning the first degree felony, the court "might" still
have held him in jail following his guilty plea, a decision Defendant does not
even challenge on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 11.
The Court should also disregard Defendant's reference to alleged
additional facts and proceedings surrounding the dismissal of his first degree
felony— claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the dismissed
felony and the subsequent filing of an innocence petition, see Aplt. Br. at 7-8 —
because those alleged facts and proceedings are not of record and are also
irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Because the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 in taking
Defendant's plea, Defendant's plea was presumptively knowing
and voluntary.
Under rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[t]he c o u r t . . . . may
not accept the plea until the court has found

the plea is voluntarily made7'

with knowledge that certain constitutional rights are waived and particular
conditions apply in pleading guilty. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), -(4)(A), -(5).
"Strict compliance with rule 11(e) creates a presumption that the plea was
voluntarily entered/7 Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,111 (citing State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d
746, 748 (Utah App. 1992)).
Here, Defendant does not claim any rule 11 deficiency in the trial court's
taking of his plea, and the record of the plea, in conjunction with Defendant's
affidavit, shows that Defendant's plea was taken in strict compliance with rule
11. See Affidavit, R52-59 (Addendum C); Plea Hearing, R82:2~7 (Addendum D);
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 12, 95 P.2d 276 ("When reviewing the trial court's
denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the reviewing court
may consider the record of the plea proceedings, including the plea colloquy
and plea affidavit or statement/').
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Consequently, Defendant's plea was presumptively knowing and
voluntary. As discussed hereafter, Defendant's claims do not undermine that
presumption.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where
Defendant has not shown that the plea was entered unknowingly
and involuntary.
Implicitly conceding that his guilty plea was taken in strict compliance
with rule 11, Defendant nevertheless contends that his plea was "not fully
informed or voluntary" because the court appointed new counsel even though
he had previously been represented by retained counsel. Aplt. Br. at 12.
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court had an independent, affirmative
duty to determine whether he was already represented by retained counsel
before appointing counsel. See id. at 10,12-13. Defendant alternatively appears
to argue that appointment of counsel when Defendant was represented by
retained counsel violated his right to counsel of choice. See id. at 12.
Defendant's first claim fails because it was not preserved below and is
inadequately briefed.

Defendant's second claim fails because it was not

preserved below, is inadequately briefed, and is contrary to the record.
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1. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court had an
independent affirmative duty to determine whether he was
represented by retained counsel before appointing counsel
fails because Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal
and, in any case, his claim is inadequately briefed.
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or
some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the
trial court record before an appellate court will review such claims/" State v.
Johnson, 77A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); accord State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. "Moreover, the issue must be 'sufficiently raised
to a level of consciousness before the trial court and must be supported by
evidence or relevant authority/" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 13, 95 P.3d 276
(citation omitted). The preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 11. If a defendant "does not argue that
exceptional circumstances or plain error justifies review of the issue," this Court
will "decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5
(Utah 1995); accord State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551; State v. Mead,
2001 UT 58, 35, n.5, 27 P.3d 1115. This Court also "will decline to consider a
defendant's plain-error arguments... if defense counsel 'led the trial court into
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error/" State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712,716 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted); accord
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,343 (Utah 1997).
In addition, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 120, | 20, 63 P.3d 72 (citation omitted). Thus, "'[a] brief is
inadequate when it merely contains bald citation[s] to authority [without]
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority/"
State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, | 32,246 P.3d 151 (citations omitted); accord
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that briefs must contain reasoned analysis
based upon relevant legal authority). "It is well established that a reviewing
court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v.
Tnomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah 1998).
In this case, Defendant never claimed below that the trial court has an
independent affirmative duty to determine whether an indigent defendant has
retained counsel before appointing counsel for him. See R70; 83:2-8. In fact,
Defendant implied just the opposite when he agreed with the trial court that
(1) at his initial appearance, the trial court would be looking only at the
information, i.e. not retained counsel's prior filings (R83:4), and (2) Defendant
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should have informed the court that he had retained counsel.

R83:3.

Consequently, Defendant invited any error in the trial court's not finding such
an affirmative duty, and this Court should decline to consider his claim on
appeal. See Hall, 946 P.2d at 716.
At a minimum, because Defendant did not preserve his claim below,
Defendant must argue plain error before this Court will consider it. See Holgate,
2000 UT 74, ^[ 11. Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br.
at 9-14. See also State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 11,17 & n.2,154 P.3d 788 (to prevail
on plain error claim, defendant must show: "'[1] [a]n error exists; [2] the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and [3] the error is harmful"')
(citation omitted). Thus, again, this Court should decline to consider his claim.
Finally, even if this Court reaches the merits of Defendant's plain error
claim, it still fails. Most importantly, Defendant does not cite any case law
holding that a trial court has an independent affirmative duty to determine
whether an indigent defendant has retained counsel before appointing counsel
for him. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14. Thus, Defendant has not shown that the trial
court's error, if any, should have been obvious. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf
16, 95 P.3d 276 ("To establish that [an] error should have been obvious to the
trial court, [Defendant] must show that the law governing the error was clear at
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the time the alleged error was made."). Consequently, Defendant's plain error
claim fails under the obvious error prong. See id. Alternatively, Defendant's
failure to cite clear governing law renders his plain error claim inadequately
briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304; Millard, 2010 UT App 355,132; Gomez, 2002
UT 120, f 20; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
2. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court's denial of
his motion to withdraw violated his right to counsel of choice
fails because Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal,
his claim is not adequately briefed, and his claim is not
supported by the record.
Alternatively, Defendant appears to claim that the trial court's denial of
his motion to withdraw violated his right to counsel of choice. See Aplt. Br. at
12-13.
Before entering his plea, however, Defendant never claimed that his
counsel of choice was previously retained counsel. See R83:3. In addition,
Defendant never argued as part of his motion to withdraw that the absence of
his retained counsel at the plea hearing violated his right to counsel of choice.
See R83:2~8. Thus, Defendant's claim is unpreserved, and Defendant must argue
plain error on appeal before this Court will consider it. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
^[ 11. Defendant does not argue plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 9-14.
Consequently, this Court should not consider Defendant's claim.
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Even if this Court reaches Defendant's claim, however, it fails. First,
Defendant cites no case law holding that, despite a Defendant's silence as to
retained counsel, a trial court violates an indigent defendant's right to counsel of
choice by appointing counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 12-13. Defendant, therefore, has
not shown a violation of his right to counsel of choice, let alone an obvious
violation of that right. Thus, Defendant's plain error claim fails because
Defendant has not shown that the error, if any, should have been obvious to the
trial court. See Powell, 2007 UT 9, t 11, 17 & n.2; Dean, 2004 UT 63, | 16.
Alternatively, Defendant's failure to cite clear governing law renders his plain
error claim inadequately briefed. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 304; Millard, 2010 UT
App 355,

t 32; Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 20; Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).

In any event, Utah case law rejects Defendant's contention. "The accused,
although guaranteed the right to counsel by the Sixth Amendment, does not
have the absolute right to counsel of his or her own choosing." State v. Arguelles,
2003 UT 1, Tf 87, 63 P.3d 731 (rejecting that trial court erred in removing
defendant's originally appointed counsel with whom defendant had apparently
established a relationship of trust) (citation omitted). "The Sixth Amendment
entails a limited right to select and be represented by an attorney of one's
choosing; however, 'the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an
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effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers/" Id.
(quoting WJieat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).

"Thus, when

considering Sixth Amendment claims, 'the appropriate inquiry focuses on the
adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such/"
Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, ±66 U.S. 648, 657 n. 21 (1984) and Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to "a
meaningful attorney-client relationship")). See also United States v. Freeman, 816
F.2d 558,564 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that "right to counsel does not imply
an absolute right to counsel of one's choice) (citations omitted); People v.
Konyack, 471 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (recognizing that
defendant's discharge of retained attorney on day of sentencing because
attorney allegedly did not adequately represent him "in no way evidences a lack
of voluntariness to the plea").
Finally, Defendant's claim fails because the record does not support his
belated contention that retained counsel was his counsel of choice. It is true, as
Defendant notes, that he was initially represented in this case by retained
counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 6,10. However, there was a period of several months
after that representation during which the case stalled. R.137:31,41,47. Then,
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at Defendant's initial appearance, Defendant made no mention of his prior
retained counsel, let alone that his prior retained counsel was his counsel of
choice. R47. To the contrary, Defendant apparently completed all the steps
necessary to find him indigent and, therefore, eligible for appointed counsel. Id.
The reasonable inference from Defendant's conduct is that his prior retained
counsel was not his counsel of choice.3
And that inference was strengthened by Defendant's and appointed
counsel's representations at Defendant's plea hearing.

Defendant was

represented at the plea hearing by appointed counsel, Andrea Garland. R82:2.
At the hearing, Defendant swore to the following salient points: (1) he had not
waived his right to counsel (R82:54); (2) his attorney was "Andrea J.
Garland"(id.); (3) his entry of a guilty plea was "of [his]own free will and choice
(id. at 56); (4) he was 56 years of age, had attended school through the 11th
grade, and could read and understand English (id.); (5) he "believe[d] himself to
be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding
these proceedings and the consequences of [his] plea"(zd.); and (6) he was "free

3

In further support, the trial court expressly rejected counsel's
suggestion, that Defendant had been led to believe at his initial appearance that
retained counsel had withdrawn, when the court observed there was nothing in
the record to support counsel's allegation. R83:3-4.
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of any mental. . . impairment that would prevent [him] from understanding
what [he] was doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering
[his] plea" (id.). Particularly, Defendant swore that he was "satisfied with the
advice and assistance of [his] attorney/7 Id. In addition, at the hearing, the trial
court confirmed that Ms. Garland had reviewed Defendant's Affidavit with him,
that she believed that Defendant understood the Affidavit and the nature of the
proceedings and the charges against him, and that she did not know of any
reason why Defendant should not then plead guilty. R82:2-3.
The record, therefore, does not support Defendant's contention that, at the
time he entered his plea, his previous retained counsel was his counsel of choice.
For this reason also, Defendant's counsel of choice claim fails.
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendants motion to withdraw his guilty plea, where
Defendant's claim that he pled to an invalid offense lacks merit
Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court should have allowed him to
withdraw his plea because appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
allowing him to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20.
In support, Defendant argues that (1) attempted possession of a controlled
substance is not a recognized offense under Utah law, Aplt. Br. at 15-18, and
(2) there can be no attempt to possess a controlled substance where "there [is] no
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evidence whatsoever that any drugs actually existed/' Aplt. Br. at 17-20.4
Defendant's first claim is contrary to the express provisions of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act. His second claim is unpreserved and lacks merit in
any event.
"The usual test for evaluating ineffective assistance claims 'applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel/" State v.
Mondragon, 2002 UT App 329U at *1 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58
(1985)). "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate both that 'counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,' and that 'counsel's
deficient performance was prejudicial.'" State v. Perry, 2009 UT App 51, ^f 12,

4

Defendant also cursorily claims that "telling [an officer] that he would
like some drugs ... is protected speech under the First Amendment." Aplt. Br.
at 16. Because Defendant provides no legal authority to support this claim, this
claim is inadequately briefed; therefore, the court should not consider it. See
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7 (noting inadequacy of appellant's brief where brief
failed to provide "meaningful legal analysis" and "merely contained] one or
two sentences stating his argument generally... and then broadly conclude [d]
that [appellant] is entitled to relief"). In any case, the law is well-settled that to
be protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech "at least must concern
lawful activity." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557,566 (1980). The possession, purchase, or sale of cocaine
is not lawful. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-4, 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2010).
Therefore, it is not protected under the First Amendment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated-22OCR, may contain errors.

204 P.3d 880 (quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19,12 P.3d 92, citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(1984)).
Here, it is unnecessary to consider the second Strickland prong, because
appointed counsel was not ineffective in pursuing a legally untenable claim. See
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 38, 55 P.3d 1131 (noting failure to establish
either Strickland prong is fatal to an ineffective assistance claim); State v.
Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38,113,227 P.3d 1264 ('"[N]either speculative claims nor
counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes ineffective assistance of
counsel/") (citation omitted).
1. Contrary to Defendant's claim, the plain language of the Utah
Controlled Substances Act recognizes that the attempt
provisions of the Criminal Code are "fully applicable" to
possession of a controlled substance.
Defendant argues that attempted possession of a controlled substance is
not a crime, because the attempt provisions of the Utah Criminal Code do not
apply to provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances Act (the Act) and that Act
does not otherwise define attempted possession as a crime. Aplt. Br. at 15-18.
This claim ignores the express provisions of the Act.
The Controlled Substances Act provides that "[ujnless specifically
excluded in or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of
Title 76, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated-23OCR, may contain errors.

chapter/7

UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8.5 (West 2004) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the Criminal Code's attempt provisions, found in section 76-4-101,
are "fully applicable" to the crime of possession unless "specifically excluded
in" the Act or "inconsistent with the provisions" of the Act. Defendant has not
cited any provision in the Act that excludes application of the attempt
provisions. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20. Nor has Defendant shown that application of
the attempt statute to unlawful possession is inconsistent with any provision of
the Act. See id.
In fact, this Court has recognized the offense of attempted possession or
use of a controlled substance, even in circumstances other than those in which
the defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced controlled substance offense. See
Aplt. Br. at 16-17 (implying that attempted possession crime exists only in guilty
plea context so that defendant can plead to lesser crime); see State v. Nunez, 2001
UT App 388U at *2 (recognizing that after defendant purchased and sought to
share marijuana with another person, there was "evidence in the record
supporting a conviction for a lesser offense of attempted possession"); State v.
Renaga-Gutierrez, 2002 UT App 111U*2 (addressing challenge to trial court's
denial of request for jury instructions on attempted possession and solicitation
of a controlled substance).
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In sum, Defendant fails to establish that attempted possession or use of a
controlled substance is not a valid offense.
b. Defendant's unpreserved claim that there can be no attempt
to possess a controlled substance where there is no evidence
that such a substance exists fails as contrary to the law.
Defendant further contends that the act of asking for a controlled
substance, when there is no evidence that such a substance exists, is not a crime.
Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant, however, did not raise this claim in his motion to
dismiss, his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or his argument at the hearing
on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. See R18-22, 69-70; 83:2-8. Nor has
Defendant argued plain error on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 15-20. Therefore, the
Court should decline to consider Defendant's claim. See State v. Miller, 2004 UT
App 445,^ 4 n.4,104 P.3d 1272 (declining to consider unpreserved issue where
defendant did not argue exceptional circumstances or plain error on appeal),
cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 12, 72
P.3d 138 (same).
In any event, the claim is frivolous. The law is firmly established that "[a]
defense to the offense of attempt does not arise . . . due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be/7 UTAH CODE ANN. §
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76-4-101(3)(b) (West 2004). Thus, Defendant's prosecution for attempted
possession was valid, even though the drugs he sought did not in fact exist.
Appointed counsel, therefore, was not ineffective in allowing Defendant to
plead to the crime.
*****

In sum, Defendant has not overcome the presumption that his guilty plea
was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Thus, Defendant has not shown that
the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw is
plea.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted June *ffi, 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. Vl-Jury Trials
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Constitution of the United States
"lAnnotated
^ A m e n d m e n t VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & Annos)
••Amendment V I . Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.

U.C-A. 1953 § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 . 5
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
llChapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
•*•§ 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 . 5 . Applicability of Title 76 prosecutions under this chapter
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the provisions
of Title 76, Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this chapter.
Laws 1997, c. 64, 5 7, eff. May 5, 1997.

U.C.A. 1953 § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
"HChapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
• * § 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 . Prohibited acts—Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters
37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more
persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any
other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( l ) ( a ) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule I I I is guilty of a second
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
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(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I I I or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact
finds a firearm as defined in Section 76- 10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or
in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which
may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person
is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or
a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied
by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or I I , marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces,
but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the
plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction
under Subsection ( l ) ( a ) , that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances
not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is
guilty of a class 5 misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
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(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of
six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's body any
measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing
serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection
(2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule I I is guilty of a second degree
felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules I I I , IV, or V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury or death
as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or
not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license
number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose
of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent oneself to be, a
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(il) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to
acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written
order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to
utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of
this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print,
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of
another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter
who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier
of fact finds the act is committed:
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(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any
of those schools or institutions;
(Mi) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at
the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution
under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 5 0 1 ;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of
a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility
as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been
established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible
for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a
first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This
Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law,
and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the
mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests,
commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of
Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware
of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the
act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where
the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections ( l ) ( b ) and (2)(c), a plea of guilty or
no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a,
Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section, notwithstanding a
charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter.
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(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction
or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution
in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the
character of the substance or substances.

(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an
assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an
imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered
practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's
employment.
(12)(a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined
in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional
ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in
Subsection 58- 3 7 - 2 ( l ) ( w ) .
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection
58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or
transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under
this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown,
if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the
charges.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.

Laws 1971, c. 145, §8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 5;
Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, §
3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § 1;
Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 161, § 1: Laws 1990, c. 163, S§
2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, S 1: Laws 1991, c. 198, 5 4: Laws 1991, c. 268, S 7; Laws 1995, c. 284,
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S 1. eff. May 1. 1995: Laws 1996. c. 1. S 8. eff. Jan. 3 1 . 1996: Laws 1997. c. 64. 6 6. eff. Mav
5. 1997: Laws 1998. c. 139. S 1. eff. Mav 4. 1998: Laws 1999. c. 12. S 1. eff. Mav 3. 1999:
Laws 1999. c. 303. 5 1. eff. Mav 3. 1999: Laws 2003. c. 10. 5 1. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2003. c.
33. 5 6. eff. Mav 5. 2003: Laws 2004. c. 36. 5 1. eff. March 15. 2004: Laws 2005. c. 30. S 1. eff.
Mav 2. 2005: Laws 2006. c. 8. S 4. eff. Mav 1. 2006: Laws 2006. c. 30. 5 1. eff. Mav 1. 2006:
Laws 2007. c. 374. 5 1. eff. April 30. 2007: Laws 2008. c. 295. 6 1. eff. Mav 5. 2008: Laws
2009. c. 214. S 3. eff. Mav 12. 2009: Laws 2010. c. 64. 5 2. eff. March 22. 2010.
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U.CA. 1953 § 76-4-101
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
"Hchapter 4. Inchoate Offenses fRefs & Annos)
"IPart 1. Attempt
•*•§ 7 6 - 4 - 1 0 1 . Attempt--Elements of offense

(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime;
(ii) when causing a particular result
his conduct is reasonably certain to

a substantial step toward commission of the crime; and
or
is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness that
cause that result.

(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly corroborates the
actor's mental state as defined in Subsection ( l ) ( b ) .

(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the attendant
circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-4-101; Laws 2004, c. 154, S 1, eff. May 3, 2004.

U.CA. 1953 § 7 7 - 1 3 - 6
Tide 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure
"^Chapter 13. Pleas fRefs & Annos)
**§ 7 7 - 1 3 - 6 . Withdrawal of plea
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall
be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be announced unless the
motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made
within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b)
shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 16, 6 1; Laws 2003, c. 290, 5 1, eff.
Mav 5, 2003: Laws 2004, c. 90, S 9 1 , eff. May 3, 2004: Laws 2008, c. 3, S 251, eff. Feb. 7,
2008.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
"Hutah Rules of Criminal Procedure
RULE 1 1 . PLEAS
( a ) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel,
unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to plead
until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.

( b ) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or
guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason
of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court
shall enter a plea of not guilty.
( c ) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
( d ) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A
defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases other than
felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a
written demand for a jury trial.
( e ) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and
may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right
to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right
to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the
charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the
plea; and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written
statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read,
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot
understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or
translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or advise
concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
( f ) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but may be
the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
( g ) If the defendant pieads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the
defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to
possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render
the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
( h ) ( 1 ) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request or
recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court.
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
( i ) ( l ) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement being made
by the prosecuting attorney.
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance
of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea
agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either
affirm or withdraw the plea.
( j ) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a
conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record the right,
on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
( k ) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. Any
variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall
be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral
attack on a guilty plea.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

f |LEQ ilSIUCf 6(tt|RTThird Judicial District

ooboo—-

MAR 1 - 2010

State of Utah,

By

tf^sm-

Plaintiff and Respondent,

DSputyT^SrT

Case No. 20100053-CA
v.
Harry Miller,
.. Defendant . and Petitioner.

Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Bench.1
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is denied.
Dated this

^

bMLf LMKfc CUUN'I >

day of February, 2010

FOR THE COURT:

£vfyi 6 Trie
Carolyn B. McHugh,
Associate Presiding Judge

1. The Honorable Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge, sat by special
assignment pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102 (2008) and
rule 11-201(6) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UT.

•

•

^

%

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

.Q^H^^G

Case No

vs.

IWirm M o r - .
Defendant.

-ss^Jiereh^
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights:

.1

-

Notification of Charges

I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Mjnimum Mandatory

A.

Oh frL JA
B.

V/i4^i9-)£rr\

C Q^J^cAjji A ^ i, In <-fa*4^a^

D.
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- Ihave received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
e elements of the crime(s)to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

''"'^ftrWs M) —cfojnM
an ife!#7-1'^u& $ "W^e.

po^S^^nx^

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
wMcEr^
provide a basis for the courtlS accept my guilty*"
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
nocontesg^

I g J ^ ^ :

f

b /

(

/ Q ^

Q^f

^

[4^JQL

1
Qj-crrV^A^.
" u/^W-c/n^r > , ' a^psj
M«- A V / / ^ •,
J
u ' lUtnA, V /<
Wu
foc<\?"
ksjAr MA\\py
MA War*
Sfo;d
0 %&, Jhco,i"
6
vv
*ftmA%&;
Isjhtr
saj'd
^j * V H tuVlfo^ r^fr;
2TsAm^J lUtifa;
<fo — f//J
i

— 6 H y 62^

^

"''i

i i

i

UA

f

K, QU ^ _ CeLjJ* ,
'I;

"' /

" 'ill r ^ "

/

.

~tss>i

J

SA i £- L Jyp C*\JAA$\A ,

ml#
7

Waiver of Constitutional Rights

A ^

lA^cn^rfH^M

* .J.^ if JM

0^\

/

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
Digitized bywill
the Howard
W. Hunter Law by
Library,
Reuben Clark
Lawcost
School,
cannot afford one, an attorney
be appointed
theJ. court
at no
toBYU.
me. I understand
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed
lawyer's service to me.
/(have) waived my right to counseL,JfThave waived my rigfit to counsel,
I navTHone so knowingly, intelligently^and^oluntarily for the following reasons:
/

/

/

/

/

f

/

If I have waived my rigljHo counsel, I certify tha(t IJiave read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of ihe charges and<cnmes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest), I alsp/understand my rights ha this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)C

<-

I ]_»• r r

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Jfb\(JH^%SJ
/
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

^-HIXX™i^

(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would
pay those costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal
to testify against me.
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdict
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up.
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is
entered.
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty^! will be subjectingmyself to serving*
a mandatory penai^^

both

-

* )ttft offtiaHsL, )/U2^uz

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victimfs
my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate..
;• J
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' 7

. . ' • ' • Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (jij)are) (is/are not) the result of
a plea agreement between my self and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those
explained below:
~ \ ,.i_. " .
^
IJ *
I
/k

07/»fl <MM f)\<^iJA^^^\ri^.
i/icm^biA,
^W\WJAsV(UniU4J: frys <WOU> C $M> SU
iV-3 a r\yrJ<?
kmA<,APjM^un^n>/i
Irial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Certification of \ oluntariness

•.

• _ I arn entering this jriea ofmyown free 'willjindxhoice. No force, threats,, or iMawfuL
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises
except those contained in this statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my- attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

^A

fi

I amyO years of age. I have attended school through the _l
grade. I can read
and understand the English language; If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment."
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning "mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the PostConviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
*
Dated this ^2_

day of I^UUlA^

20(0.

\c^//M/UJ
DEFENDANT

/

Certificate of Defense Attorney
, the defendant
I certify that I am the attorney for m
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
lll:us^
of its"
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant ir^the foregqipg affidavit, ,are
accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
Bar No.
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
Mrf[-*is
^ defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion,
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the Dleafs) is/are entered and that the
acceptanceof the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSE£UpfG ATTORNEY
BarNTT'Tte^y
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and tihe certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court,tiheCourt witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Form revised 6/25/03
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<oo- - ( r o o o M i r ^
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY
Plaintiff,

)
Case No. 091908376

' vs,
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

)

ORIGINAL

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
August 3, 2010

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE KATE TOOMEY
Third District Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 3, 2010)

3
4

MS. GARLAND:
Miller.

Your Honor, my next matter is Harry

He's in custody.

5

THE COURT:

Case No. 091908376.

6

MS. GARLAND:

Ms. Garland?

Your Honor, on this matter Mr. Miller is

7

going to be pleading guilty to a Class A Misdemeanor.

8

take his plea I'd like to address you concerning his custody

• 9

status.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. GARLAND:

12

attempt.

THE COURT:

14

MS. GARLAND:

15

THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

It would still be an

Oh, I see, the enhancement.
—

location enhancement, yes.

Okay.

All right.

Has the statement been

prepared?

17

MS. GARLAND:

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. GARLAND:

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. GARLAND:

22

THE COURT:

23

That would be an attempt?

They're just taking off the --

13

16

After you

It has.
Have you reviewed it with Mr. Miller?
Yes, I have.
Do you believe he understands it?
Yes.
Does he understand the nature of these

proceedings and the charges against him?

24

MS. GARLAND:

25

THE COURT:

Yes. .
Have you also had an opportunity to review
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-3his constitutional rights?
MS. GARLAND:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

Is there any reason why he shouldn't

plead guilty today?
. MS. GARLAND:
THE COURT:

No.

Mr. Miller, have you had the opportunity to

read the statement before you?
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir — y e s , ma'am.
Do you understand it?
Yes, ma'am.
Are you thinking clearly today?
Yes, ma'am.
Okay.

Do you understand the charge that's

brought against you?
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am, I do.
Do you acknowledge the truthfulness of the

things that are put in that statement?
MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.
All right.

Ms. Gardner, will you give me

the factual basis for the plea?
MS. GARLAND:

Yes, your Honor.

On the 1st of October of

2009, Mr. Miller attempted to purchase from an undercover officer
$10 worth of cocaine, and this happened in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
THE COURT:

Is that what happened?
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MR. MILLER:

Yes, ma'am.

2

THE COURT:

3

the State would like to add?

All right.

4

MR. LOPRESTO:

5

THE COURT:

Mr. Lopresto, is there anything

No, Judge.

Mr. Miller, do you understand that at trial

6

you're presumed innocent and that the State would have to show

7

that you committed the crime that you're charged with here beyond

8

a reasonable doubt, you would have the opportunity to have

9

Counsel represent you appointed at State expense, and you could

10

cross examine any witnesses they call.

11

to present witnesses in your own behalf.

12

You'd also have the right

You could testify if you wanted to.

If you didn't want

13

to you couldn't be forced to.

14

be held against you in any way.

15

a unanimous jury, you'd also have the right of appeal.

16

plead guilty today you're giving up those important

17

constitutional rights.

18

MR. MILLER:

19

THE COURT:

If you decided not to, it couldn't
If you were to be convicted by
If you

Is it still your desire to plead guilty?
Yes, ma'am.

The other thing is that at the time of

20

sentencing, even if the State recommends something else, the

21

Court has the ability to impose a sentence of not more than

22

one year, a fine of $2500, plus a surcharge, and to make that

23

punishment run consecutively or concurrently with any other

24

sentence you may be serving.

25

to plead guilty today?

Is it still your desire to be --
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. MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.
Okay,

Sir, you're charged with Count I, '

attempted possession or use of a controlled substance, a Class A
Misdemeanor.

How do you plead?

MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Guilty.
Are you pleading guilty because you are?

MR. MILLER:
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.
All right.

Very well.

Please go ahead and

sign that statement.
(Witness signs statement of defendant)
THE COURT:

Is a pre-sentence report being requested in

this case?
MR. LOPRESTO:
THE COURT:

Yes, Judge.

All right.

Mr. Miller, you have the right

to be sentenced in no fewer than two days and no more than 45
days, but it often times takes longer than 45 days to get a presentence report.

Are you willing to waive your right to be

sentenced in less than 45 days so that we can get that report?
MS. GARDNER:
THE COURT:
MS. GARDNER:
THE COURT:
MS. GARDNER:

You said less.

You meant more.

I'm getting tired.
I understand.
I've been on the bench for hours.
Are you agreeing that they can go a little

longer than the 45 days if they need to to get the report?
MR. MILLER:

Yeah.
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-6THE COURT:

You're willing to do that, okay.

The other

thing is that up until the time you're sentenced, you have the
ability for good cause shown to withdraw your plea.

After your

sentence you can't, so just keep that in mind between now and
then.
MS. GARLAND:
THE COURT:

Your Honor —
All right.

MS. GARDNER:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry.
Go ahead.

MS. GARDNER:
this matter.

-• .

I'm wondering if he might be released on

He can stay with his nephew.

He's lived in Utah

off and on for the last 18 years, and he has a brother here as
well as his nephew, so he has family ties here.
a job.

He draws disability.

failures to appear.

He doesn't have

I don't know if he's got some

He may have one other one.

He may have one

other case, but I'm not asking you to address that matter, just
only this one.

He understands that his actions between now and

sentencing will significant affect his eventual sentence.
THE COURT:

Mr. Lopresto?

MR. LOPRESTO:

Judge, if we could hear from pre-trial

first.
(Representative from pre-trial services stands away from
microphone and some of her statements are inaudible)
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:
(inaudible) pre-trial.

Your Honor, we're not recommending

Most recently he spent the last year in
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-7Louisiana.

He had only been in Utah one day when he got picked

upon these charges, and he only (inaudible) local tie, the
nephew.
THE COURT:

Right.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:
THE COURT:

Right.

(Inaudible).
So Mr. Lopresto, I assume that

you're not recommending it either?
MR. LOPRESTO:

Judge, my understanding is defendant has

a multi-state criminal history.

I don't have a copy of that.

I

only show three incidents in the State of Utah, but it looks like
one of which might have been a 1st Degree Felony robbery where he
did about three years in prison.

I just can't tell from the rap

sheet.
THE COURT:

All right.

The thing for me that is

important in my decision to deny your request, Mr. Miller, is
that absence of really strong local ties.

I do realize that you

have some family here, and that's good, and I hope that they can
assist you in navigating you through this, but that combined with
the fact that you don't have a job makes me think that I cannot
exercise my discretion in this way, even though this is a Class A
Misdemeanor at this point.

So your request is denied, but we'll

give you a sentencing date, okay?
COURT CLERK:

It will be September 20th at 9 o'clock with

Judge Berrett.
(Hearing concluded)
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W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LgL.C. (2170)
i
Attorney for Defendant
DEPUTY CLERK [N ~
6885 South State Street, Suite 200
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 565-0894
IN THE' THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA

•• Plaintiff,

vs.
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 091908376

:

Judge Barrett

oooOooo
COMES NOW the Defendant in the above action and moves the
Court for an Order allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
This counsel made a written appearance in behalf of defendant some
months ago. Defendant was, however, out of the State. Defendant
returned to the State without informing counsel, and was arrested
on the outstanding warrant.
When Defendant appeared in Court, he was told that counsel had
withdrawn; and he was appointed a public defender. A plea was
entered and sentencing was set. Counsel was informed that Defendant

1
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had already been sentenced. This Motion was not filed earlier
because counsel believed it was too late. This Motion is being
filed immediately upon it being determined that sentencing has not
yet occurred.
Defendant has a valid defense to the charge. He has previously
filed a Motion to Dismiss the charge, as the offense of "attempted
possession" is not contemplated under the statute. A Memorandum is
on file in support of that contention; and it is

counsel/s

intention to appeal any guilty verdict on the grounds that the
charged offense does not exist.
It is in the interest of justice to allow Defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea, which would not have been made if counsel
had been informed of the previous Court appearance. Any error in
this case was on the part of the Court, in informing Defendant that
his counsel had withdrawn.

\ilVvDATED this

\'\\

day of September, 2010.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L..L.C.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Defendant

•2
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-2P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on September 20, 2010)
MR. STANGER:

Judge, could we call the Harry Miller

case?
THE COURT:

Miller?

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Uh-huh.

I've got that right here.

Andrew McCullough for the defendant,

your Honor.
MR. STANGER:

Craig Stanger for the State.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Your Honor, I believe this matter is

before the Court on sentencing, but I have filed a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh. .

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I can explain that in about a minute-

and-a-half.
. THE COURT:

' ' •
Go ahead.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I have represented Mr. Miller on some

things for a lengthy period of time. We were aware -- I was
aware of this charge pending, but Mr. Miller was out of the
State.

I told him the first thing he needed to do when he got

back to Utah was to call me so we could set up a time to come in
here.
Somehow or another he got back to Utah without calling
me, he got picked up on the warrant.

Somebody in this court told

him I had withdrawn as his attorney.

He was assigned a public

defender and entered a plea agreement without my knowledge.. I
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-3only found out about it recently, and I filed as quickly as I
possibly could a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
THE COURT:
record is clear.
Judge Medley.

This occurred —

I want to make sure the

He was appointed an attorney on July 28th by

I don't know anything about —

the case because

I know you were on

— •

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

If you can find my withdrawal I'd like

to see the signature on it, your Honor.
THE COURT:
withdrawal.

Oh, I'm not saying that there was a

I don't even know if anybody —

you took an

interlocutory appeal, it looks like.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Yes, I did.

I won my second

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Then let's see, he w a s - - July 28th he was

arraigned, and I don't know that any —

that he advised anybody

or if it's on the record anywhere that he advised that you were
still representing him.

I don't know.

It just shows here that

he was appointed an attorney by Judge Medley.
COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

He was (inaudible).
Yeah.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:

Nobody told me a thing.

He should have said something.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
was confused.

I didn't know.

He should have, your Honor.

I think he

I think he was led somewhere to believe that I had

withdrawn.
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.-4THE COURT:
that shows that.

Well, there's nothing in the record here

It just shows he was appointed an attorney, and

there's no indication of any kind of a withdrawal or anything.
If someone hadn't told Judge Medley, all he's looking at is the
Information.

So he wouldn't know that you represented him.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, I understand that, but you know,

obviously if I had known I had been here.
THE COURT:

—

Well, I appreciate that.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:

Now the problem

The problem is this, your Honor.

Does he want to withdraw his plea?

Is

that .—
MR.. MCCULLOUGH:
here.

Yeah.

Well, let me give you a caveat

I've seen the pre-sentence report.

credit for time served.
that's enough.
Salt Lake.

It says 60 days with

He tells me he's been there 57, so

He's got a $5,000 warrant hold on him from South

Counsel tells me that if we withdraw the guilty plea

today, he wants to continue to hold him.
THE COURT:

I don't want to -—

That's a good deal, unless he didn't do it.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, your Honor, legally he didn't, do'

it.
THE COURT:

That he believes he didn't do it.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I understand the Court has denied my

motion.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh..

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

I firmly believe the Court of Appeals
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-5will disagree.

What I'd like to do is convert it so a Sery, but

that would require the State's concurrence, and they're not going
to concur.

His brother is here, your Honor.

He's got a job.

What I really need you to do is not only let me withdraw the
guilty plea, but let him out.
THE COURT:
being held on

Well, I can't let him out.

He's already

—

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
know, obviously not —

Well, right, pending —

I mean, you

you can only do what you can do.

South

Salt Lake has got a hold, and we'll have to deal with South Salt
Lake.

His brother is here.

a job to go to.

He's got a place to live.

He's got

Your Honor, I've represented this guy for years.

He'll come to court.

If you fully understood his mess with the

system, the system has messed with him, you'd be pretty
sympathetic.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm not sure I'm opposed to releasing

him to pre-trial.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, in that case we want to withdraw

the guilty plea, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. STANGER:

Well, I guess we'd have to have a hearing.
I don't know that Counsel's motion to

withdraw the guilty plea addresses the necessary (inaudible).
THE COURT:
MR. STANGER:
THE COURT:

Well, I guess the problem
—

—

what makes it (inaudible).

Yeah.

Well, that's -- it is a problem
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-6because he was represented by an attorney and we went through the
colloquy with him and we have —

she went through, the long form

with him.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:

I understand that, your Honor, but

—

And then he entered his plea.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

The crime to which he pled does not

exist.
THE COURT:

Well, that's your position, but he pled to

it and I'm going to —

I accepted the plea..

So unless you can

convince me that the appellate court in a written opinion is
going to say that it's —
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

there's no such crime, he's stuck.
Well, they are going to say that, your

Honor, if you'll give them a chance.
THE COURT:
withdraw his plea.

No.

I'm not going to allow him to

What do you want to do about sentencing?

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
going to

No.

That's a final decision?

You're not

—
THE COURT:

That's correct.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, in that case we'll go ahead with

sentencing today, your Honor.
seen the report?

I've seen the report.

Have you

Could I have a few minutes with him in the

back?
THE COURT:

Do you have a copy of it?

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
MR. STANGER:

I don't, but thank you.

Judge, I have a —

I'm covering the Rees
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-7calender, if I could leave it with the prosecutor here.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. STANGER:

I was planning on submitting on the pre-

sentence report.
THE COURT:

Sure.

MR. STANGER:

Thank you.

(Court handles other matters)
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Your Honor, could we come back maybe to

Mr. Miller?
THE COURT:

Sure.

(Short recess taken)
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Your Honor, I have gone over the

probation report, pre-sentence report with Mr. Miller.
disagree with .the conclusions.

I do want —

We don't

did want the Court

to know that his brother is here, that he has a place to live in
Salt Lake, and that is brother also believes that he has work
available.
avoid work.

I think Harry has always had work.

I mean he doesn't

I think the report says 60 days with credit for 60

days.
THE COURT:
today.

Well, I'm not —

He's going to be on probation.

I'm going to release him
He has nothing to be

concerned about as far as remaining in jail.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Fine.
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THE COURT:

2

jail on the A I should say —

3

with Salt Lake County.

4

Lake County.

5

evaluation and comply with any recommended treatment.

6

is other programming that they deem necessary or something that

7

will benefit him, he will be required to do that.

8

to do 40 hours of community service in the first year of his

9

probation.

10

So I'm going to give him an A —
suspended —

a year in

18 months probation

He won't be supervised by AP&P but Salt

I require him to complete a substance abuse
If there

I want him

No alcohol or drugs while on probation, and submit

to random testing.

Okay?

11

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

14

THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

He'll be released today.
Thank you.

Make sure you get over the Salt Lake County

15

and get signed up, okay?

Do you know what I mean by that, sir?

16

They'll give you a referral.

17

(Hearing concluded)
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